27
May
2016
How Much Would You Pay to Vote?
I think I’ve come up with a thought experiment that will get us through the logjam. I’m not saying this will make everyone agree with me, but I hope it finally gets people to realize that you can’t simply ignore marginal analysis when it comes to voting.
As an economist that thinks on the margin and understands subjectivism shouldn’t we be trying to learn something about peoples’ revealed preferences?
Marginal analysis isn’t a code of conduct we are promoting, after all, it’s a behavior that we are assuming people are already engaging in.
As an economist that thinks on the margin and understands subjectivism shouldn’t we be trying to learn something about peoples’ revealed preferences?
Daniel, I’m not telling people, “Hey, stop voting you fool!” Rather, I’m criticizing the justifications for voting that other analysts give.
Would you have said to people in 1871, “Hey! Why are you criticizing Ricardo? Let’s just look in the market and see how people value goods by their actions.” ?
Fair enough. I’m conflating you with plenty of people who do say that you shouldn’t vote because of comparable marginal analysis.
They could always claim people are just irrational but then I’d suggest as in my second paragraph that they’re not applying marginal analysis like an economist.
re: “Would you have said to people in 1871, “Hey! Why are you criticizing Ricardo? Let’s just look in the market and see how people value goods by their actions.” ?”
I probably would have. I’m not an especially brilliant economist so it probably would have taken me until 1874 or 1875 to get on board the marginal revolution.
I probably would have. I’m not an especially brilliant economist so it probably would have taken me until 1874 or 1875 to get on board the marginal revolution.
Plus we would have been working in factories.
fwiw I think people are deciding on the margin with voting with about as much fidelity as they do in any walk of life (which is, IMO, a decently high degree of fidelity). and they’re placing value on their identity as a good citizen and their duty as a good citizen. Part of the logic is an internal “be the change you want to see in the world” consistency where there’s a desire not just to have a healthy electorate but to be a part of that healthy electorate.
This is hard to think about in consumption goods terms, although consumption goods is a start. I think a better way to think about it is in terms of Akerlof and Kranton’s identity economics models where people are making decisions to create and maintain identities.
Part of the logic is an internal “be the change you want to see in the world” consistency where there’s a desire not just to have a healthy electorate but to be a part of that healthy electorate.
Right, and so if I’m talking to someone who agrees with me that the two-party system is horrible, and that both Trump and Clinton are monsters, then it’s weird to say, “I want the world to change by perpetuating this horrible system of voting for an evil candidate, just like me.”
Talk about defining deviancy down. Trump for instance is a wind bag with bad policies; Pol Pot or Saddam Hussein or Lon Nol or Adolf Hiltler or Josef Stalin were monsters. I pick that list because I am certain you would have opposed the only method to end their rules.
Well, there’s this dumb constitutional amendment preventing us from pretty easily testing this…
How much were poll taxes, anyway?
I thought I would look at voter turnout before and after the 24th Amendment to see if having to pay to vote really mattered, but as it turns out most of the states which had poll taxes had already repealed them.
The highest poll taxes were in South Carolina and Mississippi. The Mississippi poll tax in 1890 was $2. Voter turnout soared after South Carolina abolished its poll tax in 1952. Mississippi’s voter turnout also soared during the 1964 election.
BTW, political machines actually did pay people to vote for their candidate. Cowen’s Marginal Revolution points out vote-buying is actually quite common in the Dominican Republic.
So based on this the answer to Bob’s question for a lot of people would be “not much”
Well, it was 1890 dollars.
Ah yeah, good point.
Whilst I do agree with you, I would also argue that this false belief is a way in which individuals in groups seem to coordinate their behavior. It seems to be an example from Leeson’s Austrian Law and Economics – article.
I’m from Chicago You have it backwards. How much will you pay me to vote?
That just means that in a hypothetical market where people can trade votes, you’re more likely on the selling side than the buying side.
No vote should be a vote for the state to have no agreement with you.
When however no vote is a vote for whoever wins the majority vote, the marginal analysis needs to be tweaked.
Just to add a data point, in Australia the price of a vote is negative $20 (AUD of course) unless you attempt to contest the fine, in which case the price goes to negative $180 (plus court costs). At this going rate, quite a lot of people turn up to vote.
Market prices, where would we be without them?
The same argument would apply to lottery tickets. No value in buying more than one, just be sure to always buy the winning ticket.
I agree with that for lottery tickets. If you enjoy the possibility that you might win, buy one. If you are considering buying ten, you would probably be better off buying one for each of ten weeks, even if the jackpots differ.
(Although you could always enjoy the experience of buying ten once more than buying one ten times, in which case you should ignore my advice.)
After reading some of the comments I think an equally interesting question would be: How much would someone have to pay you to vote for the candidate you would least like to see In office?
Bob, I had some thoughts on this back when you wrote your fridge magnets post some time ago. Let me see if I can refine them.
1) Voting for the lesser of two evils, voting for your preferred candidate, or not voting looks like a collective action problem to me. If I am going to get either Kang or Kodos, and I slightly prefer Kodos, then (a) I can defect and collect the benefits of not voiting or of voting for third party candidate Ross Perot, or I can (b) cooperate with my fellow voters who prefer Kodos to Kang and vote for Kodos. You’re right that my defection probably has about zero marginal cost,but if enough people on my side defect, I don’t get my preference.
2) The bigger problem is that I think you’re stealing a base by moving from “your vote for Kodos doesn’t count for very much” to what I think is your implied conclusion of “therefore, you should vote for someone who matches your values more closely.”
Ultimately, I think there are two answers:
(a) To answer the question on your terms, I think you need a full cost-benefit analysis. (i) If you’re already voting for the down ballot choices such as school board, where your vote matters more, the cost of voting at all for president is fairly low. (ii) then the question is what is the benefit of voting for your preferred candidate vs your preferred plausible candiate, and therefore the opportunity cost of each as well. I think the benefits either of voting for Richard Feynmann or for Trump are fairly low, FWIW. (I can’t see the point of voting for Johnson – as long as I’m voting for a candidate who won’t win, I prefer Feynmann.)
(b) On my terms, I think society doesn’t work if enough of us defect. I don’t know that I prefer Trump to Hillary or vice versa, but if I did, I would vote for them for the same reason that I don’t litter and I don’t lie myself out of jury duty – because I don’t want to let everybody else down, and I don’t want to live in a society where people do.
“(b) cooperate with my fellow voters …”
That’s basically a self-fulfilling prediction of how your fellow voters will vote, though.
Which is why, in 2012, you tell your fellow Conservatives that you’re going to vote for Ron Paul, no matter what.
What did all their hype about Romney being “more electable” amount to? Zilch.
They no longer have the “more electable” argument, if they can be reminded of that loss.
That’s why Choice (B) fails.
“(b) On my terms, I think society doesn’t work if enough of us defect.”
People mistakenly believe that “society” must be comprised of single-minded individuals.
No one needs a government in order to trade with others, and no one needs to be obligated to someone in order to trade with others.
People can just pay for stuff and leave. Everyone’s happy.
For those who want longer term trade agreements with each other, they can find arbiters and enforcers to which they can mutually agree.
And that wouldn’t affect their ability to pay and leave at other business owners’ properties.
“Society” doesn’t have to mean “obligated to each other”, but Leftists always define it as if it does.
Another question would be which has more value, a contribution to the campaign or an extra vote. Would my $100 be better contributed to my favorite candidate or used to buy a vote for my favorite candidate.