Perhaps this quote from Brad DeLong will be more convincing:
In the 12 years of the Great Depression – between the stock-market crash of 1929 and America’s mobilization for World War II – production in the United States averaged roughly 15% below the pre-depression trend, implying a total output shortfall equal to 1.8 years of GDP. Today, even if US production returns to its stable-inflation output potential by 2017 – a huge “if” – the US will have incurred an output shortfall equivalent to 60% of a year’s GDP.
In fact, the losses from what I have been calling the “Lesser Depression” will almost certainly not be over in 2017. There is no moral equivalent of war on the horizon to pull the US into a mighty boom and erase the shadow cast by the downturn; and when I take present values and project the US economy’s lower-trend growth into the future, I cannot reckon the present value of the additional loss at less than a further 100% of a year’s output today – for a total cost of 1.6 years of GDP. The damage is thus almost equal to that of the Great Depression – and equally painful, even though America’s real GDP today is 12 times higher than it was in 1929. [Bold added.]
I stand by my claim: Keynesians think the mark of a good policy is that it creates a boom. Especially after a major downturn, Keynesians want to see another boom to make up for it. Thus the Austrian critique is no caricature.
And for the finishing blow, let’s not forget this passage from The General Theory itself:
The remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a lower rate of interest! For that may enable the boom to last. The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in abolishing booms and thus leaving us in a semi-slump; but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom.
I don’t see how there is any argument on this point. The Krugman apologists should just say, “That’s right Murphy, we love booms. Why do you love unemployment? Are you more of a funeral than a wedding kind of guy?”