At This Point Steve Landsburg Must Classify Me as a “Nuisance”
I wanted to push back against Steve Landsburg casually saying that libertarian property rights theory doesn’t work. I thought Rothbard probably handled this type of thing, but I was pleasantly surprised to see just how specific it was. Here’s Rothbard:
Consider the case of radio waves, which is a crossing of other people’s boundaries that is invisible and insensible in every way to the property owner. We are all bombarded by radio waves that cross our properties without our knowledge or consent. Are they invasive and should they therefore be illegal, now that we have scientific devices to detect such waves? Are we then to outlaw all radio transmission? And if not, why not?
The reason why not is that these boundary crossings do not interfere with anyone’s exclusive possession, use or enjoyment of their property. They are invisible, cannot be detected by man’s senses, and do no harm. They are therefore not really invasions of property, for we must refine our concept of invasion to mean not just boundary crossing, but boundary crossings that in some way interfere with the owner’s use or enjoyment of this property. What counts is whether the senses of the property owner are interfered with.
But suppose it is later discovered that radio waves are harmful, that they cause cancer or some other illness? Then they would be interfering with the use of the property in one’s person and should be illegal and enjoined, provided of course that this proof of harm and the causal connection between the specific invaders and specific victims are established beyond a reasonable doubt. (emphasis added)
Now for those of you getting snarky with me about my unwillingness to grapple with the “obvious” implications of my property rights worldview–I’m thinking of you, Josiah Neeley–I’m sure you will apologize in light of this stunning revelation.
I think David Gordon has adressed that problem as well
Bob,
I apologize for doubting your willingness to tackle the tough issues.
In fact, I’ll go further, and say that your Rothbardian exegesis of why the photon lady shouldn’t win her lawsuit is persuasive.
I would note that your proposed solutions wouldn’t work in the case of a nuisance suit based on climate change (since there is harm and your contractual solution is I feasible).
I suppose Rothbard wasn’t big on Coase.
I suppose Rothbard wasn’t big on Coase.
He wasn’t a fan of the Coase Theorem, if that’s what you mean.
Yes, an excellent explanation and article!
Bob – let me say at the outset that I am sympathetic to the conclusion that you and Rothbard want to draw here. However, as much as I would like to see a successful defense of the absolutist interpretation of libertarian property rights (since it would make the job of defending libertarianism so much easier), I don’t think either you or Rothbard have managed to do so here.
Rothbard says:
//They are invisible, cannot be detected by man’s senses, and do no harm. They are therefore not really invasions of property, for we must refine our concept of invasion to mean not just boundary crossing, but boundary crossings that in some way interfere with the owner’s use or enjoyment of this property. What counts is whether the senses of the property owner are interfered with.//
There are at least 2 problems with this:
i) First, while this may be a plausible response to the question of radio waves, this doesn’t really refute David Friedman’s light photon hypothetical. The light that my neighbour turns on in his property can in fact by detected by my senses. Now, let’s stipulate that I am a person who dislikes any form of artificial light (i.e. any light other than what’s provided by nature). Let’s further stipulate that I haven’t installed any form of artificial light source in my own property either (i.e. I prefer to live completely in the dark after the sun sets). In this case, the fact that I can see the light from my neighbour’s property does interfere with my enjoyment of my own property (since, as stipulated, I dislike any form of artificial light). Therefore, a strict interpretation of libertarian property rights still leaves us with the absurd conclusion that I should be in a position to prevent my neighbour from switching on the lights in his property.
ii) Second, Rothbard doesn’t seem to have realized that by stating that only “boundary crossings that in some way interfere with the owner’s use or enjoyment of his property” count as invasion, he has just declared that trespassing is no longer a violation of libertarian property rights. Let’s say that a stranger enters my property without my permission when I am not present in it. Let’s further stipulate that he leaves my property before I return and does no harm to it. In this case, his act of trespass cannot be detected by my senses. Nor has it caused any harm to me or my property. So does this mean that trespassing is not a violation of libertarian property rights?
Now let’s move to your second line of defense. You state:
//One problem right away is this: it is physically impossible for her to comply with the injunction, and even if the sheriff comes and puts her in jail, shucks, she is still (however weakly) “invading” Firstenberg’s property — for example, by exerting a slight gravitational force on his couch — because her body has mass.//
This response only works for those acts of “invasion” that a person does by the sheer fact of her existence. It doesn’t apply to the case of artificial sources of light since it is in fact physically possible for her to remove all the artificial sources of light in her property without killing herself.
You further state:
//I could imagine an “absolute property rights” judge ruling that you can’t use the power of law to stop someone from committing an invasion that you yourself are constantly reciprocating.//
This could be a plausible response to your example of people exerting slight gravitational forces on other people’s property by the sheer fact of their existence. In general, this can be a plausible response to those “invasions” that a human being needs to do in order to survive biologically (like breathing and therefore polluting your neighbour’s property with carbon dioxide). However, this response again doesn’t work in the case of the person who dislikes any form of artificial light. He himself hasn’t installed any form of artificial light source in his property. Therefore, since he himself is not reciprocating this invasion, the judge in a world of absolute property rights would have no choice but to rule in his favour.
You further state:
//The real solution to these silly brainteasers is that people would come to contractual agreements to avoid such messes. In the modern world, few people ever stumble upon truly virgin territory that they must homestead.//
While this is true, this still doesn’t establish the case for an absolutist interpretation of libertarian property rights. All that someone who wants to refute this absolutist interpretation needs to do is to provide a single example where it is possible to homestead virgin territory in the modern world and where, therefore, the “silly” brainteasers posited by Friedman can in fact come into existence. I am sure you will acknowledge that while it is difficult to stumble upon truly virgin territory, it is still *possible* to do so. And once a single example is provided where an absolutist interpretation of libertarian property rights can lead to absurd conclusions in the real world, the case for the absolutist interpretation fails.
Lastly, you state:
//To suppose that WiFi connections could cripple a free society is a bit like a socialist worrying that free labor markets might lead to starvation: What if nobody wants to be a farmer?//
I don’t think your analogy works here. The obvious economist’s response to the socialist worrying about free labour markets leading to starvation is that if nobody wants to be a farmer, the price of food will increase so much that there will be a natural incentive for people to become farmers. And as long as a few people “rationally” respond to this incentive (even if the vast majority of people act “irrationally” and refuse to respond to this incentive), the problem of starvation can be averted.
However, in case of (say) Friedman’s light photon example, you need just 1 person to act “irrationally” and express his dislike for seeing artificial sources of light in his property. And that 1 person acting “irrationally” while everyone else acts “rationally” is enough for the absolutist interpretation of libertarian property rights to lead to absurd conclusions. Friedman’s light photon example only fails if each and every human being acts “rationally”.
The difference between the 2 cases is that for the socialist worrying about starvation, just a few people in that society “rationally” responding to the incentives that a free market provides with everyone else continuing to act “irrationally” is enough to avert the possibility of starvation, whereas in order to avert the conclusions from Friedman’s light photon example, you need each and every person in that society to act “rationally”. The former (i.e. just a few people acting “rationally”) is a much more likely scenario than the latter (i.e. everyone acting “rationally”).
In conclusion, I think it’s fair to say that Friedman’s objections still stand.
I look forward to your response to my comment. I would really like you (or anyone else) to provide a successful refutation of Friedman’s objections, because, like I mentioned at the beginning of my comment, I do want to be able to defend an absolute interpretation of property rights. But as long as Friedman’s objections stand, I don’t see a way of doing so.
(TLDR. Sorry. It wasn’t directed at me, anyway.)
“… by stating that only “boundary crossings that in some way interfere with the owner’s use or enjoyment of his property” count as invasion, he has just declared that trespassing is no longer a violation of libertarian property rights.”
Trespassing interferes with the owner’s use or enjoyment of his property. The trespasser, by trespassing, is claiming ownership of something that doesn’t belong to him.
“Trespassing interferes with the owner’s use or enjoyment of his property. The trespasser, by trespassing, is claiming ownership of something that doesn’t belong to him.”. guest by that argument, sending photons into someone’s leg in a way that causes absolutely no harm would still be claiming ownership of the person’s leg.
The trespasser’s body takes up scarce space, which limits the use of property by the owner. This doesn’t apply to the photon example.
The logic leads to saying that if the owner isn’t present or doesn’t notice, then it becomes perfectly okay to trespass. Trespassing in this case does not interfere with the owner’s “use” (he’s not necessarily using that portion of property if he isn’t there) or “enjoyment” (if he doesn’t notice it, it can’t possibly disturb his enjoyment).
But then if you make the statement broad, then even radio waves can interfere with someone’s “use” like in the case Tel brings up below or “enjoyment,” like if just knowing the radio waves are there annoys me.
I do not think the logic leads where you claim it does.
If the owner were away and had his nephew stay at the house to look after it, the stipulated trespass would still limit the use of the property for the owner, not the nephew (it would for the nephew as well but it would be the owner who would be justified in taking legal action)
I was referring to “the use” of property, not the enjoyment of it.
The boundary exists to keep people from entering, not photons.
And in your example, nothing is being done to the leg that would prevent the exercise of ownership.
(Anticipating an objection: I reject the idea that “Intellectual Property” can be actual property.)
As long as the trespasser does no damage and gets out of the way, nothing is being done to prevent in any way the use or enjoyment of the property by the owner merely by trespassing.
If the owner finds the presence of another on his land distressing or unpleasant, then why could he not equally find the presence of particular photons unpleasant or distressing?
Is the principle that you can decide what goes on your land, or is the principle that you can only restrict what causes actual physical harm?
That sounds absurd.
So, if I came and ate food from your garden, you wouldn’t see that as me claiming ownership of what you produced?
Whether I consume it or use it, I am claiming authority to utilize it as I see fit.
That’s a claim of ownership.
Sumantra Roy:
You have raised some good points, and for certain arguments concerning absolutist libertarian ethics, they do indeed represent a strong challenge.
However, as just alluded to, there are other absolutist libertarian ethics arguments that I think remain unchallenged by the points you have raised above. I do not want to defend any particular person’s arguments, so all my responses below I hope you take as my own arguments.
You wrote:
“First, while this may be a plausible response to the question of radio waves, this doesn’t really refute David Friedman’s light photon hypothetical. The light that my neighbour turns on in his property can in fact by detected by my senses. Now, let’s stipulate that I am a person who dislikes any form of artificial light (i.e. any light other than what’s provided by nature). Let’s further stipulate that I haven’t installed any form of artificial light source in my own property either (i.e. I prefer to live completely in the dark after the sun sets). In this case, the fact that I can see the light from my neighbour’s property does interfere with my enjoyment of my own property (since, as stipulated, I dislike any form of artificial light). Therefore, a strict interpretation of libertarian property rights still leaves us with the absurd conclusion that I should be in a position to prevent my neighbour from switching on the lights in his property.”
First, and most important of all, anytime I see a response that uses the word “absurd”, I always make sure that this is not being used as a cover for an inability to provide a strong logical rebuttal. Many people call an argument absurd simply because they don’t like it. Sometimes arguments that feel absurd, defined in that way, are in fact correct.
For the photon example, I do believe you are making a false inference. Absolutist libertarian ethics does not hold that person A can use force to stop B from turning on his (B’s) own light. What absolutist libertarian ethics actually says is that A cannot send photons into or onto B’s property. Those are two different things. If I were to make an absolutist argument, I would say ” OK, you can turn on all the lights you want on your property, but you have to ensure that you have to make the effort to prevent any of those photons from reaching my property.”
Now surely, this is not absurd on the face of it. There is nothing absurd about asking someone to do whatever they want on their property, as long as they don’t initiate force (including unwanted photons) onto anyone else’s property. Of course, this will make life, in the short run at least, very difficult and challenging. But, that fact alone is not a refutation of the absolutist ethical deduction.
Secondly, with all claims of rights violations, it must be the case that the claimant is not engaging in the very violating activity that he is accusing someone else of doing. That is to say, any supposed or alleged consistent and logical application of absolutist libertarian ethics, must be capable of actually being practised by every individual. If a claim of a supposed violation carries the implication that not even the claimant him or herself can avoid doing the same thing, no matter what they do, then that supposed violation is not actually an ethical violation. All ethics must include choice. Without choice it becomes a scientific, not an ethical, issue.
Thus, if B claims that A is violating his (B’s) rights, on the basis that A is causing photons to land in or on B’s person or property, then at the very least B him or herself must be refraining from sending photons onto A’s property. If it is impossible for B to do, which as far as I can tell, is definitely the case since merely by existing all of us are sending photons to another’s person and property all the time merely by virtue of existing, it follows that theae “ambient” photons are not actually an aggression against another’s rights.
And the reason they are not an aggression is NOT because the photons in and of themselves are “harmless” (after all, we can imagine a death ray laser beam of photons, and as you point out, logically it would mean people can trespass as long as they don’t interfere with the property owner’s enjoyment, which means if someone is on vacation, then it is open season), but rather, the reason these photons are not aggression is because it is impossible for the ethics implies by the violation claim to be universally practised.
Thus, a correct application of absolutist libertarian ethics does NOT lead us to extend the logic without the important constraints of universality and tu quoque. You have to be cognizant of the formal requirements for ALL ethics and not just libertarianism.
Major.Freedom: thank you for the thoughtful response to my comment.
You said:
//Now surely, this is not absurd on the face of it. There is nothing absurd about asking someone to do whatever they want on their property, as long as they don’t initiate force (including unwanted photons) onto anyone else’s property. Of course, this will make life, in the short run at least, very difficult and challenging. But, that fact alone is not a refutation of the absolutist ethical deduction.//
If the practical implications of a certain ethics makes life very difficult and challenging in the short or long run for just about everyone living in a particular society, then I’d say that this is an extremely strong reason to question the validity of the ethics. I don’t see how a particular ethics that can lead to such impractical implications can continue to be considered valid.
Assuming that there is a single person in a society who is as unreasonable as the person in my artificial light example (and the Firstenberg case demonstrates that such people do exist and are not merely a figment of Friedman’s or my imagination), what absolutist libertarian ethics suggests (if I have followed your chain of thought correctly) is that everyone living in the vicinity of that person has to be asked to:
i) Spend the money to construct a high-enough boundary wall on their property to prevent any artificial light from spilling over from their property
ii) Make their entire property perfectly sound-proof in order to prevent any sound waves from spilling over
iii) Install some technological means to prevent any radio waves emitted by some of their devices like phones, TVs etc. from spilling over
And these are probably just a few examples of what they need to do – there will presumably be other changes they need to make to their properties to prevent other sorts of emissions that I haven’t considered here from spilling over.
Further, if it were extremely costly (even though technologically possible) to prevent some of these emissions from spilling over so as to make it unaffordable for some of the individuals living in that society to take the necessary emission control steps, then as a practical matter, they would in fact need to stop using the things that are causing those emissions. So if preventing radio waves from spilling over from a TV or phone or laptop or Wifi connection is possible but costly enough to be unaffordable to some or many of them, they would need to stop using those devices.
And last, if it were currently technologically impossible to prevent certain emissions from spilling over, then everyone would in fact need to stop using that device which emits those emissions until such time as someone invents the technology to prevent those emissions from spilling over.
According to the absolutist libertarian ethics, all this has to be done by everyone else living in that society solely in order to accommodate that 1 unreasonable individual even though this individual is not harmed in any way (except perhaps in a psychic sense) by such emissions.
I suppose someone who believes in the absolutist libertarian ethics can still respond by saying something along the lines of “So be it. Tough luck. Deal with it. But you still haven’t proven logically that absolutist libertarian ethics is wrong even though it may sometimes lead to completely impractical conclusions.” Like I said, if an ethics can sometimes lead to completely impractical conclusions in the real world, then that’s an extremely strong reason to suggest that it has been refuted.
You further stated:
//Thus, if B claims that A is violating his (B’s) rights, on the basis that A is causing photons to land in or on B’s person or property, then at the very least B him or herself must be refraining from sending photons onto A’s property. If it is impossible for B to do, which as far as I can tell, is definitely the case since merely by existing all of us are sending photons to another’s person and property all the time merely by virtue of existing, it follows that theae “ambient” photons are not actually an aggression against another’s rights.//
As I alluded to my in response to Bob earlier, this is a plausible response only if the “emissions” being sent by a human body have the exact same physical properties as the emissions being sent by an artificial light source. I don’t know enough about physics to know the answer to this question, but presumably, given that a human eye can see artificial light but cannot see the “emissions” coming from a human body, there must be some differences in the physical properties of those emissions.
So while you are correct that the emissions being made by a human body merely by virtue of existing cannot be considered an aggression since it is impossible for this to be universally practised, this argument wouldn’t apply to the case of artificial sources of light.
On a slightly different but related note, I have a question for you. If you believe in absolute property rights, then you must presumably have a consistent, objective and universal standard to determine whether or not a given act constitutes a property rights violation. And this standard must be consistently applied in each and every situation now and in the future – with no exceptions permitted whatsoever – no matter what the cost and no matter what the real-world practical implications of not permitting any such exceptions are.
So what, according to you, is this standard?
Rothbard (and Bob Murphy) seem to have proposed the following standard: “A boundary crossing that can be detected by the owner’s senses is a violation”. As we both agree, this standard is flawed because among other things, it allows trespassing when the owner isn’t around.
So presumably, you have a different standard. From what I have gathered, your standard is “ANY boundary crossing is a violation, as long as the boundary crossing was not being caused by the mere existence of the alleged violator”. Please let me know if this is in fact your standard or whether it’s something else.
“I don’t know enough about physics to know the answer to this question, but presumably, given that a human eye can see artificial light but cannot see the “emissions” coming from a human body, there must be some differences in the physical properties of those emissions.”
Everything from radio waves, microwaves light, X-rays and gamma rays are photons, varying only in energy, frequency and wavelength.
Everything emits black body radiation as a consequence of being above absolute zero. At room temperature we get a maximum in the infra red region. As we heat up (say a poker) to 1000K, we shift this maximum to the red part of the spectrum – hence we see a hot poker glow red. At 5500K, the temperature of the surface of the sun- we get a peak in the visible part of the spectrum. A very hot poker appears to glow white hot. Welding heats metal up more, and produces even higher energy UV radiation.
From Wiki “A black body radiates energy at all frequencies, but its intensity rapidly tends to zero at high frequencies (short wavelengths). For example, a black body at room temperature (300 K) with one square meter of surface area will emit a photon in the visible range (390–750 nm) at an average rate of one photon every 41 seconds, meaning that for most practical purposes, such a black body does not emit in the visible range.”
So in this case, it seems MF could be right, but there is still room for some interpretation. Simply by existing a body emits photons at all wavelengths. although we could argue that we do not emit visible or higher energy wavelengths at detectable levels, so we do not interfere with our neighbours by existng – except in the infra-red.
Harold – thanks for responding to my comment.
As you pointed out, the human body emits photons at different wavelengths compared to an artificial light source, which means that there is at least one important physical difference in the photons being emitted by a human body and by an artificial light source, which seems to me to neutralize MF’s original argument of universal practice.
However, let’s stipulate for the purpose of this argument that all photons are created equal no matter what the source. In that case, MF’s universal practice argument seems to initially get resurrected and seems prima facie to be a good response to my and Friedman’s objections to absolute property rights.
However, let’s take MF’s argument further in this case. If the argument is that the photons being emitted by an artificial light source are not a property rights violation because human beings themselves emit photons merely by existing, then should not the photons being emitted by a lethal laser beam also not be considered a property rights violation on the same grounds? Solely from the standpoint of universal practice, there doesn’t seem to be any difference between an artificial light source and a lethal laser beam.
So it seems to me that even if we stipulate that all photons are created equal, that is still not enough to resurrect MF’s argument.
Well, your next door neighbour might happen to be operating a nuclear waste dump, emitting copious gamma rays, they are also technically photons, just with a shorter wavelength, greater penetration and the ability to ionize human DNA, but other than that, exactly the same particle.
I guess under all circumstances we end up talking about cause and effect, whether physicists regard them as the same particle doesn’t mean they have the same cause, nor equivalent effect. That doesn’t negate Rothbard’s argument, but it does require a line to be drawn somewhere. Personally, I don’t have too much issue with drawing a clear line somewhere between infra red and gamma rays, given the energy difference, and one causes damage while the other does not.
I guess it’s kind of difficult to explain the current situation in those terms; where the FCC will be totally cool about you radiating photons at 2.45 GHz but they will freak out if you radiate at 2.15 Ghz, and it’s illegal to even detect photons at 10.525 GHz (or it is in my country anyhow). There’s a certain weirdness in that which I think might be difficult to fit into any Rothbardian framework, nor any sort of common sense framework for that matter.
//I guess under all circumstances we end up talking about cause and effect, whether physicists regard them as the same particle doesn’t mean they have the same cause, nor equivalent effect. That doesn’t negate Rothbard’s argument, but it does require a line to be drawn somewhere.//
Actually, I think Rothbard’s argument does get negated based on what you wrote above.
Rothbard (in the paragraph quoted by Murphy) has proposed 3 separate tests to determine when a boundary crossing becomes a property rights violation:
1) The boundary crossing can be detected by man’s senses.
2) The boundary crossing affects the owner’s use or enjoyment of his property
3) The boundary crossing causes harm
As an aside, I’ll note that this is highly confusing because these 3 tests are not necessarily compatible with each other. So which of these 3 tests one is actually supposed to use is left for the reader to guess. (I hope Rothbard wasn’t suggesting that one should use whatever test is convenient for a particular argument :-)). This is obviously a case (contrary to what Murphy said in his article) of Rothbard desperately trying to rescue a fundamentally flawed principle (absolute property rights) and confusing himself and the reader even more in the process.
Anyway, the test that you alluded to when you talked of cause and effect in the context of photons is the 3rd one – i.e. a boundary crossing that causes harm is to be considered a violation.
We are then back to the issue of trespassing – if harm is the standard on the basis of which a boundary crossing becomes a violation, then a trespasser who causes no harm to the property is not violating the owner’s property rights.
And if harm is to be defined both in physical and psychic terms in order to rescue the argument from this difficulty related to the issue of trespassing, we are then right back to the problem of the unreasonable individual claiming psychic harm from seeing an artificial source of light.
More I have thought of this issue over the years, more I have realized how water-tight David Friedman’s original argument was – no matter how I tried to attack it in my own mind, his original argument always came up trumps.
//I guess under all circumstances we end up talking about cause and effect, whether physicists regard them as the same particle doesn’t mean they have the same cause, nor equivalent effect. That doesn’t negate Rothbard’s argument, but it does require a line to be drawn somewhere.//
Actually, I think Rothbard’s argument does get negated based on what you wrote above.
Rothbard (in the paragraph quoted by Murphy) has proposed 3 separate tests to determine when a boundary crossing becomes a property rights violation:
1) The boundary crossing can be detected by man’s senses.
2) The boundary crossing affects the owner’s use or enjoyment of his property
3) The boundary crossing causes harm
As an aside, I’ll note that this is highly confusing because these 3 tests are not necessarily compatible with each other. So which of these 3 tests one is actually supposed to use is left for the reader to guess. (I hope Rothbard wasn’t suggesting that one should use whatever test is convenient for a particular argument :-)). This is obviously a case (contrary to what Murphy said in his article) of Rothbard desperately trying to rescue a fundamentally flawed principle (absolute property rights) and confusing himself and the reader even more in the process.
Anyway, the test that you alluded to when you talked of cause and effect in the context of photons is the 3rd one – i.e. a boundary crossing that causes harm is to be considered a violation.
We are then back to the issue of trespassing – if harm is the standard on the basis of which a boundary crossing becomes a violation, then a trespasser who causes no harm to the property is not violating the owner’s property rights.
And if harm is to be defined both in physical and psychic terms in order to rescue the argument from this difficulty related to the issue of trespassing, we are then right back to the problem of the unreasonable individual claiming psychic harm from seeing an artificial source of light.
There’s a long discussion here:
https://mises.org/library/law-property-rights-and-air-pollution
I kind of agree though, that situation “1) The boundary crossing can be detected by man’s senses.” is inevitably false for microwaves, gamma rays, asbestos dust, and many other things; yet situation ” 3) The boundary crossing causes harm” may be delayed from anything from weeks to decades, and then may only be statistical in nature (i.e. may not happen in every case). This leads to a difficulty in enforcement.
It’s a cruel world.
The real question at hand though, is whether Rothbard solves this better than government.
“… then should not the photons being emitted by a lethal laser beam also not be considered a property rights violation on the same grounds?”
Depends on the intent of the operator.
Peanuts are natural. Should your enjoyment of peanuts be considered a property rights violation because your neighbor downwind might die from exposure?
Water in sufficient doses is lethal or capable of damaging property. Should your access to such doses of water be considered a property rights violation because it might get on your property and damage it or kill you?
… Migt kill your neighbor, I meant to say.
/Depends on the intent of the operator.//
Intent seems to be yet another standard that has to be added to the already long list of often mutually incompatible standards.
I hope you realize how unconvincing the overall “absolute property rights” argument ends up sounding when the proponents of the argument have to keep on adding more clauses and caveats in order to rescue it?
Anyway, intent (by which I take you to mean “intent to commit harm”) isn’t really a good standard. I may cause a lot of harm to you or your property without intending to. For instance, I may direct the lethal laser beam at an object on my own property in order to destroy it but this may unintentionally end up damaging your property. My lack of intent to cause damage to your property, however, doesn’t preclude it from being a rights violation in standard libertarian ethics.
Rothbard argues for strict liability in which intent is not relevant. His example is an innocent bystander caught in crosfire. There was no intent to cause him harm, but Rothbard says the shooter is still liable.
So in the peanut example, you would presumably be liable if your peanut fragments went onto your neighbors property and he died as a result.
“Intent seems to be yet another standard that has to be added to the already long list of often mutually incompatible standards.”
If intent isn’t a necessary aspect of property rights violation, how do you propose holding nature accountable for damage it causes?
It’s not intent that is added to libertarian property rights; Rather, it’s a birthright to a certain quality of existence that is added to the statist position.
“For instance, I may direct the lethal laser beam at an object on my own property in order to destroy it but this may unintentionally end up damaging your property.”
Or, you may unintentionally damage my enjoyment of my view by building your property in view of mine.
The point being that my rights end where yours begins.
I would say that every photon of the same wavelength (and hence same energy) was equal, but photons of different wavelengths were not the same as eachother. thus two photons of blue light are the same as eachother, but not the same as a photon of gamma radiation. Since everything above abdsolute zero emits some number of photons at every wavelength, we can be said to be emitters of all radiation.
A single photon of any wavelength is unlikely to be a nuisance. So if we are to say that above a certain number there is nuisance, but below a certain number we can ignore them. We recieve maybe 10^21 photons of visible light per second during daylight, so a person emitting one every 41 seconds is well below normal levels that we would see. You would have to wait far longer than the age of the universe to get the same as 1 seconds worth of normal visible radiation.
So if we accept that one does not committ a trespass if it is impossible not to merely by existing, then we cannot say that invasion by photons per se is a trespass.
However, that cannot mean that photons are never a nuisance -the same applies to noise after all. We cannot exist without creating some sound, but noise can still be a nuisance.
Presumably we are back with the idea of harm and of interfering with the owner’s enjoyment of his property.
Rothbard says “costs are purely subjective and not mesurable in monetary terms.” Arthur Firstenberg suffers a significant cost due to the invasion by his neighbours photons – he proved this by offering $10,000 for them to stop.
I too find it difficult to reconcile how one could not find in his favour in a strict libertarian manner unless you would also not find in his favor if he was sliced to pieces with a laser.
Perhaps MF could elucidate?
“Rothbard says “costs are purely subjective and not mesurable in monetary terms.” Arthur Firstenberg suffers a significant cost due to the invasion by his neighbours photons – he proved this by offering $10,000 for them to stop.”
Which is the cost *to him* (“subjective”).
It could be different for someone else.
(I realize I’m glossing over the issue of opportunity costs, here, but hopefully this argument will suffice, even if it’s imprecise.)
Let’s ignore spin, and entanglement. It could get messy.
It is the cost “to him”, but who else could we possibly be talking about? He is the property owner that is suing. We either say the costs are based on market rates, or we say the costs will be assessed subjectively, but we can’t have either or depending on what is convenient for your argument.
“… but who else could we possibly be talking about?”
When Rothbard says that costs can’t be measured in monetary terms, what he’s saying is that there’s no nominal amount of money that can necessarily be associated with a good, because the valuation of goods is based on subjective ends, not on money units, per se.
Or, as Andrew_FL has said: The real economy is measured in stuff, not dollars.
“We either say the costs are based on market rates, or we say the costs will be assessed subjectively, but we can’t have either or depending on what is convenient for your argument.”
Methodological Individualism explains that market rates obtain from the valuation of the means to satisfy subjective ends.
So, if some newly discovered material is great for building, but nobody is aware of it, the market rate will reflect a lack of demand for its use as a building material.
Nobody *must* use that material for building, and no one who owns that material is entitled to have people purchase it for that end.
The price that obtains from such a valuation, or lack, thereof, is the uncoerced, and therefore “market”, rate.
Nobody should have their businesses subsidized to correct for this slack in demand, as if consumers *should* want to buy from their business.
Rothbard says that to litigate against nuisance (as opposed to trespass)the plaintiff must prove harm.
How are we to say if someone has suffered harm? And if so, how much harm?
Rothbards also said that the harm suffered by the farmer from the railway was not the same as the market value of the crops. the harm was subjective and could be more than the market value.
So by Rothbards reasoning, in order for Firstenberg to win his case, all he need to prove is that he suffered harm as a result of the photons entering his property. His offer of cash to me is sufficient proof that he suffered harm if harm is subjective.
Either Firstenberg should win his case, or we cannot say the farmer suffers subjective harm.
Sumantra:
You wrote:
“As you pointed out, the human body emits photons at different wavelengths compared to an artificial light source, which means that there is at least one important physical difference in the photons being emitted by a human body and by an artificial light source, which seems to me to neutralize MF’s original argument of universal practice.”
That is not how photon frequencies work. There is no rigid line between natural and artificial frequencies. All frequencies exist in the air, and all sources emit all frequencies. It is a question of percentages and intensities, and identifying who caused what.
I am quite cognizant of the implication to laser beams.
Sumantra Roy:
With respect of the physics of photons, Harold provided a good explanation. The standard model of physics of photons has them being indistinguishable from one another except for frequency.
Thus, we cannot actually observe photons and label some as artificial and others as natural. There is only frequency that distinguishes one photon from another.
So if we consider the case of B claiming that A is violating his property rights with photons, then he could only have a case if there are photons of a specific frequency entering his property whereby it is possible for A and anyone else to choose to not be the cause of photons with a specific frequency from entering B’s property.
Moving on, you said that if practising a particular ethics is difficult, compared to how we used to live, that this constitutes a “strong case of a refutation”. Yet you have not explained how or why that is true. You took it for granted that the difficulty level in adopting the practise of a particular ethics is the standard. That the more of a challenge it represents to people in the short run, that the less valid that ethics will be.
I reject that claim. I reject it because it can be used to justify the continuation of slavery in a world where slavery has been practised for many years. Masters who are faced with losing slaves would find their short term interests seriously challenged. It would be very difficult for them to adjust to the slaves having more liberty.
It is precisely the same principle behind individuals having more liberty in our society. Yes, if people had more liberty to decide which photon frequencies to allow touching their bodies, that would make it very challenging for those who have heretofore “gotten away” with being able to cause photons of a certain frequency to enter other people’s property. Right now you don’t even think about the wi-fi photons that your neighbour may not want if they knew more about what was going on.
Many years ago when certain people became unconsciously adapted to slavery, they did not even think about the fact that their clothes were influenced by the existence of slavery. When slavery ended, it was a shock to their lives, and rightfully so.
What you are saying is that if ending violations of liberty, that people have come to take for granted for so many years, and have adapted all their other activities to it, is a difficult thing to do, if it is too much of a shock to people, that this alone somehow refutes the ethics.
In answer to your question of what standard I think is right, I believe you are asking me to give you an exhaustive list of what constitutes a violation and what does not. That is something I cannot give you. I can only give you “meta” arguments of the right way to construct the laundry list, the right way to apply libertarian principles, and the right way to identify rights violations.
What you paraphrased me as saying in your last paragraph, I would say is a formal requirement, is not exhaustive, and was only meant as a response to the particular claim that absolutist libertarianism includes photons as such, where an individual can claim a violation if ANY photons enter their property that are caused by someone else.
Absolutist libertarianism does NOT mean absolutist subjectivity.
Maybe I’m missing something, but why would we have to differentiate photons in terms of frequency in order to tell what is artificial and what isn’t? Couldn’t the evidence be as simple as “Hey, he has a lamp, and look, if you stand here in my house, you can see the light clearly coming from the lamp.”
Bharat,
You’re right, if your neighbor can see your lamp, then we are talking about specific photons.
I should have been more clear that I was only addressing the Wi-Fi topic. We can of course take this as far as the logic will go. Nothing I have said or will say will be exhaustive for all circumstances and all scenarios.
But I do think you get the logic, which is precisely why, I think, you made that good point.
MF- do you disagree with Rothbard’s differentiation between trespass and nuisance based on the there being a physical object involved in trespass?
I disagree with the standard “If A does something to B’s property that does not prevent B from enjoying his property, then A is not violating B’s rights.”
But I also disagree that the above standard is refuted or challenged by “But then trespassing would be legal.”. I disagree with that response because trespassing does not leave property unchanged. Foot prints, hairs, skin cells, altered material objects, etc. Human action affects material goods.
It is impossible for A to trespass on B’s property without affecting B’s property in SOME manner, and it would consistent with the absolutist libertarian logic that B should not have to accept his own property being affected by A without B’s consent.
To enjoy one’s property as one sees fit in an ethical context means property owners must live in a world where ” natural” events will change their property. No individual can be identified as the cause for this unwanted change, so the property owner cannot seek recompense from any living human. He has to deal with it and suck it up.
But, when property is affected by human action, that is when property owners can seek recompense, but only if the changes are caused by human action, and not human existence which is a “natural” affair.
You cannot charge me with a violation for breathing CO2, since doing so is what every human has to do as part of existing. But you can charge me with a violation if I blast CO2 gas into your house with a machine.
Actually, looking back I had mis-read Rothbard. He says that the difference is specifically not between prevention of use and interference with enjoyment. Instead he says it due to the “intangible” nature of some things that they require proof of harm. The only definition of intangible I can see is that you cannot directly sense it. This contradicts his earlier statements about harm being subjective. One can clearly have ones enjoyment ruined by the presence of something you require a machine to detect, and a blind person can presumably take action against trespassers he cannot see.
He says undetectable gasses should not be invasion because they do not interfere with the owners enjoyment or use. this is wrong because they occupy volume and thus prevent the owner using that volume.
Your position is more consistent than Rothbards, I think. However all radiation will effect some change to the owner property, so any radiation from a machine entering your property would be actionable on this strict standard.
But the reason Rothbard is evasive is possibly because the absolute standard produces results that are unacceptable to most people. That does not make them wrong, just pretty difficult to implement.
If me using a machine to produce CO2 which ends up in your home is actionable, then are all fossil burning factories are actionable? People do not have to burn fossil fuels in order to live.
I have responded to your comment at the end of this article.
There’s a democracy sneaking into this… which might have annoyed Rothbard, and the less pragmatic libertarians.
Radio waves don’t harm *most people* but suppose you want to build a very sensitive scientific experiment that is disturbed by radio interference, then in that case and special cases radio is harming your enjoyment of your property. You could build a Faraday cage and given that probably no one else cares about your problems you would have to do that (presumably you don’t have an army of killer robots to defend your property rights, but you will do after you get this experiment right).
What about if you want to build a communications network and you need guaranteed clear spectrum to do that… you aren’t most people, but a Faraday cage won’t solve this, and perhaps you could get more people onside, by promising to provide then with wonderful new gadgets.
The way the FEC took power of the radio waves was by promising an interference-free radio listening experience. Democracy gets to define the property rights once again. Government gets to declare itself the rightful democratic decision maker.
So basically we now defer the very rubbery definition of property rights to the equally rubbery definition of harm. You end up believing what the majority believes, which is at least well defined, even if a bit arbitrary and unstable.
Yes. Harm is a matter of human experience and therefore intrinsically subjective. Rothbard thinks he is relying on purely objective fact when he is actually invoking human/social conventions — that do clear up and better define an otherwise difficult situation.
The second argument just proposes compromising property rights, again on the basis of accepted social conventions and common sense. An intelligent suggestion, but not particularly convincing of the case that was being made.
So you accept that harm is subjective, and therefore social conventions are all we have available to define property rights… and strangely you also believe that these same social conventions compromise property rights.
That’s kind of like the tail wagging the dog, while the dog also chases the tail… or something.
I would say it is a lot like the way subjective values produce objective prices via markets that everyone can know, just by looking around. And then the perception of the state of the economy influences individual valuations, which influences prices….
But yes, kind of like a dog chasing his tail, in some reapects.
Recently I went as far as to suggest that ordinal preferences might lead to cardinal prices via markets, but even I (bold and brash as I am) would baulk at calling this “objective”. I mean, you have never seen a fad turn around and suddenly yo-yos become worthless?
How do you define “objective” then? Do you say that prices will always come to the same equilibrium for arbitrary market participants, regardless of individual preference? We could test that pretty quickly in simulation at least… but around here, don’t be surprised if someone pops an historical example on you.
No. This is a misunderstanding of the meaning of objective. Objective doesn’t mean (or at least doesn’t always mean) universal and unchanging (or correct or these other sorts of connotations that get attached). It means viewed as an object — from an external frame of reference. Subjective means from within the POV of the thing considered. A person’s values are subjective, but *that they have said values* is an objective fact of the universe, as reflected by their choices/actions and all sorts of other externally visible facts which everyone can plainly see from the outside.
Think about it — ABCT makes no sense if prices are not objective. Price distortions — as compared to what? Economic dislocations — compared to what? Prices do change, but that does not mean that they are not reflective of an underlying objective reality. The underlying objective reality is changing, and prices are changing along with it.
Alright…comment got eaten. I’ll try again.
I think this is a misunderstanding of what is meant by objective. Objective refers to frame of reference — ‘from outside.’ It does not (necessarily) mean a whole bunch of other ideas often conflated with it — universal, absolute, unchanging, ‘correct.’ etc. Sometimes those things follow, sometimes not. The temperature outside is an objective fact, right? It changes.
In this case, a person values a thing subjectively, but *that this person values things such a way* is absolutely an objective fact of the universe. Anyone can see this plainly from the outside, manifested through this person’s actions, choices, etc.
Think about it — ABCT (not to mention a whole bunch of other central arguments of the Austrian School) makes no sense if prices are not objective. ‘Price distortion’ — compared to what? Distortion of the production structure — compared to what?
Prices are objective and reflect objective facts about underlying reality. As that reality changes, prices change.
** I guess I should also add — I screwed up earlier, Rothbard actually did use objective facts to justify his position — social customs, etc are objective facts, that emerge similarly to prices. He needed to get from the subjective experience of harm to ‘something everyone could agree on.’ Which he did. He just wasn’t using the kind of objective facts he thought he was. Anyway, I think I got the idea across…
“‘Price distortion’ — compared to what? Distortion of the production structure — compared to what?”
Excellent point; I try to make it when opposing bitcoins.
Prices are objective only relative to subjective ends; When the ends change for the individual, the value for the means to achieve those ends change.
(This is not to say that the price listed will necessarily change, since, even with the change in demand from one person, a store owner may still be able to justify the currently listed price based on changing demand from others.)
Prices reflect real, albeit subjective, preferences.
Ummmmm….
You know what? Now that I think about it, that might have had some influence on my phraseology.
But yes, I think the basic confusion here is like Tel pointed out — the meaning of words like objective and subjective & how they are used. Namely, there is too much baggage attached to them. Subjective doesn’t necessarily mean arbitrary & meaningless, objective doesn’t necessarily mean the opposite. Even a word like relative is a bit loaded. Clear them up of the baggage, though, and they become pretty useful.
I think the mechanics of price & value we are talking about here are pretty elementary, though, & not controversial. It looks like everybody understands that ok (which, actually, is why I drew that parallel. I guessed everybody would understand how objective things can ‘grow out of’ subjective things in that case). But when they start inadvertently attaching the baggage, meaning gets messed up and people start drawing weird, unjustified conclusions — often completely subconsciously. They think they understand pricing (or whatever) — and they do. It’s much more fundamental and important stuff causing the trouble that they don’t even realize.
And if I may hit on one of your points, again:
(I’ll get some push back from the bitcoiners, but hopefully this will help.)
Price distortions, in the Austrian sense, are prices which do not align with the subjective values of consumers (in a nutshell).
Consumer preferences being the catalyst for all economic activity, any non-coerced and non-fraudulent transaction must logically conform to them.
So, trying to set prices on opposition to where the market sets them defeats the purpose of acting, which is why price controls, as well as prices in money units which do not reflect use-values for the goods that are bought with that money, necessarily hinder economic calculation.
The common was of saying it is that market prices reveal the subjective preferences of the participants. I’ll agree that on a given day at a given marketplace, prices are objective facts… they really happened that day. Doesn’t mean you are going to get the same prices any other day.
Also, strictly speaking market prices don’t reveal everyone’s preferences, only those on the margin where transactions are occurring. A certain number of buyers will think the price is way too high and not even bother participating, these preferences remain hidden.
It’s very rare in any kind of economics to get a control experiment where you can measure outcomes both with and without some government policy influence. That’s not really a problem with the Austrian School, it’s a problem with the nature of what you are dealing with. Just that the Austrian School spends more time admitting this limitation, the other schools barge ahead and pretend.
Consider for example, Krugman’s “Potential GDP” charts, compared to what? How can he know something potential?
I did a quick search, to find more examples of this, try here (topic is the Greek economy):
http://www.cepr.net/documents/greek-economy-2015-01.pdf
So the figures have been “cyclically adjusted” how? Taking the percentage of “potential GDP” which was measured how?
Economics always has a seen and an unseen, it’s unavoidable, because we are talking about choices so there will be a road not taken. How to measure that? You can’t, all you can say is that based on my belief system and models this is what I believe is the difference between seen and unseen.
When you say that prices are distorted, you are saying they are ‘wrong.’ Wrong compared to what? To what they would have been, had there been no intervention.
You can only say something is ‘wrong’ by comparing two objective things. In this case, the objective price I’m seeing now vs the price that should have resulted sans intervention. It is true that I cannot know exactly what it should have been. It is false to say that this unknown price is not an objective notion within the context of the theory/argument being made — if you do, you undo pretty well all of ABCT (and a lot of other Austrian concepts).
Maybe being connected to every computer on Earth is overrated, and privacy, to the extent it is desired, is better served with the limitations of wired, or line-of-site-wireless, communication?
Anyway …
Communications devices are designed to receive a wide range of signals by choice, so it’s my position that no harm can be done by the “interference”.
Also, IP is not property, in my view; and therefore hacking cannot be a crime when there has been no physical trespass of property. There’s no need for a government “cyber-security” program.
(I can read your storage media because the communications network you use is designed to grant access [let’s say, wirelessly], and you don’t have authority over what I do with the wireless devices I own.)
“But suppose it is later discovered that radio waves are harmful, that they cause cancer or some other illness? Then they would be interfering with the use of the property in one’s person and should be illegal
Rothbard says that radiowaves should be made “illegal” if they were harmful. But “illegal” in what sense?
In Rothbardian anarcho-capitalist paradise, there is no longer any criminal laws — only private tort law where the victim can obtain justice only if they privately bring a legal action against the perpetrator or aggressor and have the money to do so. Without criminal law and the state to enforce that law, merely private law suits would be a ridiculously impractical and inefficient way to stop crimes, and would limit justice to those who can afford
Rothbardian “justice” would be pathetic caricature where the rich have a license to commit crimes.
“But “illegal” in what sense?”
In the same sense that any other property crime would be. In the sense that you could go to your private security company, explain to them how this person is aggressing against your property, and obtain compensation if you successfully argue the case in a private court.
“The rich have a license to commit crimes”.
Like getting Congress to set up the Federal Reserve System so that WWI could be funded without the populace being forced to explicitly pay for it in real time?
http://factsandotherstubbornthings.blogspot.com/2013/01/poor-kid-was-just-couple-years-too.html?showComment=1358998365568#c2813953362544372035
Like funny money banks getting government bailouts while denying the previous collapse in prices was simply an anticipated result of false unsustainable prices having been bid-up by funny money loans? Is that the kind of corruption you anticipate?
I rather think LK was talking about some completely hypothetical situation, something along these lines:
Fortunately, something like that could only happen in a Rothbardian world, so we are all perfectly safe.
“… only private tort law where the victim can obtain justice only if they privately bring a legal action against the perpetrator or aggressor and have the money to do so.”
Yes, you have to fund your own justice. The crime is that someone harmed you, not that you can’t afford justice.
No one is obligated to defend you.
You could say that God obligates you to defend someone, but that’s a different issue, and would be the only theoretically compelling argument for such an obligation.
“Without criminal law and the state to enforce that law, merely private law suits would be a ridiculously impractical and inefficient way to stop crimes, and would limit justice to those who can afford.” Lord Keynes, I think Bob has addressed that issue in the past by invoking contingency fees. Whether that would solve the problem is another story.
Illegal = aggression = unjustified force = justified to use force to stop it.
The person in the photonic harm case sincerely believed that he was harmed by the neighbours photons. In fact, he was so convinced he offered $10,000 for the neighbor to stop using the equipment – an offer that was turned down. He chose to move out of the house in preference to suffering the photonic assault from next door, so clearly the presence of the photons actually did prevent him enjoying his property. Are we to say that we can ignore this because his harm is irrational as it has no scientific basis?
Or do we say that actual physical harm must be demonstrated before action is taken? If so, then the trespasser in Sumantra Roy’s example does not need to wait until the owner is out to trespass, he can go in any time he wants, and possibly peer in the windows, as long as he does no actual physical harm.
If psychological harm – such as the presence of a neighbor in your garden or the presence of radio waves in your house – is sufficient, then we seem to be back to square one – anyone can claim that the radio waves are disturbing them.
We need to clarify the notion of harm before we can say this one is resolved.
“I hasten to add that Rothbard’s analysis was not ad hoc, a desperate attempt to rescue his system from the corner into which he had painted himself. No, before bringing up radio waves, Rothbard had developed the principles of strict liability, strict causality, the burden of proof, procedural rules, and the crucial distinction between trespass and a nuisance.”
“ad hoc, a desperate attempt to rescue his system from the corner into which he had painted himself”
What a perfect description of this argument!
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=h95SA9SuQFM
Having now read Rothbard’s paper, I still don’t see why we should reject Firstenburgs claim.
He says that for any claim proof should be beyond resonable doubt.
He also says costs are entirely subjective and not related to market prices. This was necessary for his objections to Coase.
Firstenbergs claim sems to be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
1) The photons were real and did enter his house
2) He suffered a cost because of them – entirely subjectively, and he proved this by offering money to desist. And costs are subjective, as Rothbard himself explained.
If we say costs are not subjective, buit require some sort of actual harm (however we maty desribe that) the we could reject the claim, as there is no scientific basis for harm from these waves. But we cannot do that and stick to Rothbards arguments against Coase.
The MF defence is that photons are an inevitable by product of existing. However, one can be liable for other inevitable product of living such as noise that become a nuisance and prevent people enjoying thier property, and presumably for high powered laser attacks.
Am I missing something?
“However, one can be liable for other inevitable product of living such as noise that become a nuisance and prevent people enjoying thier property, and presumably for high powered laser attacks.
“Am I missing something?”
Well, I, for one, reject that noise can be a property rights violation where the property has not been designed to block it out.
Ron Paul would disagree with this, as would other Austtro-libertarians.
But I think mine is the consistent position.
In his paper Rothbard refers several times to noise causing actionable nuisance.
Tel pointed out above the discussion of nuisance vs trespass. Rothbard says something is not trespass if it places no material object within the property of another. It prevents enjoyment rather than use of the property. Such things should only be actionable if harm can be proven (says Rothbard). Firstenberg proved harm by offering actual money to stop the nuisance.
This would mean gamma radiation was nuisance, but alpha and beta radiation were trespass as they consist of particles with mass.
Harold, how did he prove harm by offering money to stop the nuisance? I will give you $5 to stop killing people and I have proved you kill people because I offered you money to stop. It is just as likely that Fistinberg suffers a Somatoform disorder than EHS which according to the WHO ” The majority of studies indicate that EHS individuals cannot detect EMF exposure any more accurately than non-EHS individuals. Well controlled and conducted double-blind studies have shown that symptoms were not correlated with EMF exposure.
…
There are also some indications that these symptoms may be due to pre-existing psychiatric conditions as well as stress reactions as a result of worrying about EMF health effects, rather than the EMF exposure itself.”
“There are also some indications that these symptoms may be due to pre-existing psychiatric conditions ”
That does not make any difference if harm is subjective, as Rothbard claims it is. I do not claim for a moment that the radiation caused him any physical harm. Certainly his offering moneyt is no evidence at all for that. His harm was entirely subjective, and likely due to mental ill-health, but that does not matter.
By offering money he was showing to the rest of us that he felt his harm was genuine. An as harm is subjective, felt harm is actual harm.
Harold,
By offering money he was showing us that he valued his neighbor not having EMF emissions more than $10,000. It does not prove harm. This incident proves he is willing to offer money for something and would be like saying; I offered them one million dollars to sell their house to me, they refused my offer and now I want two million dollars from them. Nothing about harm is affirmed here.
There is objective harm-something is broken or damaged- and there is subjective harm- a mental state linked to the ambiguity of being worse off in a purely subjective sense. These typically go hand in hand as in the Fistinberg case. He claims emotional distress and physical distress. If his emotional distress is caused by his physical distress then he must prove the cause of his physical distress.
If his physical distress is caused by Monribrot’s EMF waves then he has a case against Monribot if his physical distress has a psychosomatic cause then it is self caused. The purpose is not necessarily to dispute harm as much as it is to prove cause.
Firstenberg’s case, if psychosomatic, should be directed at whoever told him about the harm of EMF waves. Was he harmed by the information or was he harmed by choosing to believe the information. It is absurd to think that Firstenberg is not a responsible party in this.
How does an individual litigant demand compensation for low level microwave damage that may very slightly increase their chance of cancer (when observed over huge sample sizes, including many people quite dissimilar to the person making the claim)?
Forgot to mention, the “damage” only shows 30 years later… statistically speaking that is.
Okay, Bob, how are you not using “property rights” as a catch all at this point?
That quote from Rothbard is a pathetic “handling” of this issue! How does he know *for sure* radio waves do no harm? Isn’t value subjective? What if just knowing they are there ruins my property value for me? And he didn’t even attempt a harder case, like smoke from a BBQ, which absolutely is harmful and can definitely alter someone’s unjoyment of their property in a real, tangible way.
Yes, exactly. Harm => (dis)utility => – value
And value is subjective.
Case closed.
In the second argument, “contracts” were merely the magician’s cape covering up the sleight of hand that limited property rights ex nihilo.
Not convincing.
“What if just knowing they are there ruins my property value for me?”
Since the value of your property (on the market) consists of other people’s valuation of it, it isn’t something to which you’re entitled.
Similar to Walter Block’s argument that you can’t own your reputation, such that slander and libel can be crimes.
(And yes, he is being hypocriical in his libel case against, I think, the NYT[?].)
Callahan can answer for himself, but I think he just worded it in a way that people are bound to misinterpret. He’s speaking about the subjective value of the property to the owner, not its value on the market.
That is Block’s argument? And he wants to be taken seriously?
Our reputation consists of what others think of us.
We don’t own our thoughts, so we are not entitled to have others think of us how we would like them to.
That’s a great argument.
[Audio]
Defending the Undefendable by Walter Block
7. The Slanderer or Libeler
https://mises.org/library/7-slanderer-or-libeler
Correction:
That should read “We don’t own the thoughts of others, …”.
That’s the stupidest libertarian argument I’ve ever seen. That is, first and foremost, a dishonest representation of libel/slander laws. They do not criminalize thought. They make it illegal to claim false things about a person, so the argument fails right out of the gate. Second, who says ownership is relevant to this? Not me and certainly not anyone who has cracked opened a legal textbook.
Block sure does “Defend the Undefendable”. He couldn’t put up a good argument to save his life.
It’s my voice: I can say whatever I want to whomever I want on my own property, or on theirs if they permit me.
(All rights are property rights.)
No one said it criminalized thought. Block is saying it criminalizes an owner’s use of his own property in such a way as does not harm someone.
Big friggin’ deal. Just because something is yours doesn’t mean you can do whatever you want with it. For instance, you cannot use lethal force against a burglar unless your life is in imminent danger.
False.
Trespass and theft don’t harm anyone.
“Big friggin’ deal. Just because something is yours doesn’t mean you can do whatever you want with it.”
You don’t own the thoughts of others. They are permitted to think of you however they like.
Therefore, no one who slanders you causes you harm.
“False.”
True:
“Human Rights” as Property Rights
https://mises.org/library/human-rights-property-rights
“Trespass and theft don’t harm anyone.”
Slanderers aren’t stealing from you.
(Or are you actually saying these don’t harm anyone?)
Non-sequitur.
That was a bad argument.
Harm is not the sole reason for laws.
“Non-sequitur.”
Why do you believe that?
“That was a bad argument.”
How so?
“Harm is not the sole reason for laws.”
Property rights violations are the sole reason for legitimate laws, which may include harm.
So, I agree with your statement, as stated.
Samson:
You asserted theft does not harm anyone. That is ridiculously false. Humans DEPEND on material goods in order to love and be healthy.
Stealing someone’s life saving medicine, or their food, or their clothing or house, are some of the more obvious examples of theft harming the owners.
You make foolish comments on this blog because your approach is to be hostile, and not to learn and teach..
Block’s argument is that if slander were legal people would be less likely to believe false claims about others and reputations would be more secure
Well, that argument is not as bad, but it’s still really bad. That’s for the person targeted by the statements to decide. It’s amazing how often libertarians use paternalist cost-benefit arguments based in economics, the kind of stuff I thought they reject as “pragmatism”.
I think this is easy Gene, and BTW for this example it really isn’t any different then it is with Government run law.
Since BBQ smoke is a generally accepted thing in our society, and its risks are more or less accepted, you won’t get your law insurance to pay for the trial. So you would have to do it with your own money. (So you wouldn’t do it in the first place if you aren’t basically insane and rich) Secondly you won’t find a judge ruling in your favour, well exactly because it is generally accepted. There the story ends. You cannot sue for something which isn’t a concern for society (for many people, the more people the higher the chances you can sue and win). If you are alone in thinking something infringes on your property then it is just a lost case for you. No matter if you are absolutely right, and no matter if private law or government law.
In contrast to BBQ smoke it starts to be different with cigarette smoke. If things go further the way they go now I could imagine people actually starting to sue others for cigarette smoke, and winning those trials, if this hasn’t happened already anyway.
So if people start (maybe initiated through some eyebrow raising studies) getting really concerned about BBQ smoke in general as well, then maybe BBQ smoke is actually a thing you might be able to sue for as well in the future, no matter if government law or private law.
Basically justice is what the public thinks it to be. No constitution can withstand that. The only question is which system (government, or private) transmits the publics thinking of justice better into actual law.
Since BBQ smoke is a generally accepted thing in our society, and its risks are more or less accepted, you won’t get your law insurance to pay for the trial. So you would have to do it with your own money. (So you wouldn’t do it in the first place if you aren’t basically insane and rich) Secondly you won’t find a judge ruling in your favour, well exactly because it is generally accepted.
Are property rights contingent on what is “generally accepted” in a society? I don’t think libertarians want to go there.
I’m not sure if all libertarians want to “go there” but that is exactly how David Gordon dealt with the photon issue
Yes I think so. I don’t know if other libertarians want to go there, but in my view this is just the reality as it is.
What you can do is educate people about what is right and wrong, about the effects of certain things. Like I think MWs are infringing on my right to contract for a wage lower than that and are therefore also morally a bad law (Not only economically useless). However if I am alone thinking that, well then…
So it is still useful to think about how should property rights look like ideally. Like are there some general principles to guide us (like reciprocity). And starting from scratch helps finding that out and educates me and hopefully others as well. However there are no easy answers to many questions like noise, smoke etc… This will always be a question of what is acceptable/tolerable for most people and what is not. And this has nothing to do with which system of law is used.
If you believe the radio waves are harmful, you are welcome to accuse the source of them of doing you harm, and take your case up to a private judge/jury. At which point you would have to offer your evidence of what the harm is and what your compensation should be.
If all you have to say is, “Well just knowing that they are there bothers me!” then the judge and jury will probably laugh at you and tell you to go pound sand.
BUT, let’s say that radio waves are a highly controversial issue in society where roughly 50% of the country believes they do in fact cause serious harm to a person’s health. Well in this case it’s much more likely the jury takes your side.
Basically, your precious “democracy” is still going to come into play here, one way or the other.
I’m a bit confused here — is this statement (and the one above by skylien) meant to be critical or supportive of Gene’s? Or maybe just meant to be a statement of the fact of the matter?
I can’t really tell. Maybe that’s good? I can’t be sure, but it almost sounds like everyone is agreeing…
Is that the universe collapsing that I hear? 🙂
As far as Gene uses his reasoning here to infer that this is a reason why privatizing laws wouldn’t work, I am critical of him. That is basically all. The other fight (how well Rothbard really handled the stuff I leave to Bob).
This thread needs some Elinor Ostrom or Barry Weingast.
Whatever happened to Archimedes Plutonium?
Over different discussions here the position has become clearer to me. Perhaps I may summarise, to clarify the ideas for me if not for anyone else.
Position according to Rothbard.
People have property rights. They have an absolute right to prevent unwanted intrusion by physical objects because an object prevents them using the space it occupies. So a trespasser is preventing the owner using the space occupied by the trespasser. No harm need be proven to enforce this right. They also have a right to enjoy their property, and thus have a right to prevent others from interfering with that enjoyment. Nuisance occurs when something that is not physical enters the property and diminishes the owners enjoyment. For example, noise. However, the owner must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there has been harm when trying to enforce his right to enjoyment of the property.
The problem arises because the notion of harm is not clear. We have left behind the land of absolute rights and entered the realm of fudge.
Costs are subjective, not determined by market prices. Therefore if you feel harmed, you are harmed. But in order to enforce your right against nuisance you must be able to prove your subjective harm beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case of a high powered laser slicing off your hand, there is clearly harm, so enforcing the right is clear cut. For most people they could not demonstrate harm from say radio waves, so they cannot enforce action against radio transmitters.
If I have described the position correctly it raises some difficulties. Carbon dioxide has mass, so should be subject to the absolute right to allow enforcement without proving harm. If I have not described it correctly perhaps someone could explain where I went wrong.
Major.Freedom:
I doubt that we are going to make further progress if we continue with this discussion. However, I will make one final attempt at making some progress.
You said:
//I am quite cognizant of the implication to laser beams.//
I am not sure what exactly you mean here. If you are cognizant of the implication to laser beams, then what exactly is your conclusion here? Do you mean that you acknowledge that your universal practice argument fails, i.e. that photons from an artificial light source are in fact an aggression? Or is it something else?
//Moving on, you said that if practising a particular ethics is difficult, compared to how we used to live, that this constitutes a “strong case of a refutation”. Yet you have not explained how or why that is true. //
It constitutes a strong case for a refutation because it violates common sense. Saying that everyone in a society needs to accept a massive reduction in their quality of life in order to accommodate one unreasonable individual who is not affected negatively in any way (except in his own mind) by the practices of everyone else violates common sense.
Now you may well ask me “But how do we know common sense is always correct? On what basis are you making common sense your standard?”. I don’t make the claim that common sense is *always* correct. I am pretty sure that it is possible to identify situations when a particular common sense was shared by lots of people, but was ultimately proven to be wrong.
What I do claim, however, is that if something violates common sense – especially a sense that is shared by almost everyone living in a society – then there is a strong burden of proof that then falls on the person who thinks that the common sense in that case is wrong, i.e. in this case, the burden of proof will lie on that person to prove that he is right and everyone else is wrong. He may well be proven right, but it’s up to him to prove that he is right.
I guess your next question could be “But why should the presumption of truth be on the part of common sense and not on the part of the person whose argument violates common sense? Why should common sense be given this unfair advantage?”. My response would be that to make any progress in moral philosophy, you have to start somewhere, and giving the benefit of the doubt to common sense until proven otherwise is a very good place to start, because common sense is usually (though not always) correct. This is the approach that Michael Huemer took in his book The Problem of Political Authority, and it makes for a far more convincing (at least to me) defence of libertarianism than anything else that’s out there.
In addition, I would ask you in return “Why in fact should we accept absolutist libertarian ethics when it leads to completely impractical implications in some cases? On what is absolutist libertarian ethics itself grounded that makes it correct even when following it strictly can sometimes lead to a vast decrease in the quality of life of just about everyone living in a society?”
The only comprehensive attempt at grounding absolutist libertarian ethics that I’ve seen is Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics. While I don’t want to start a long discussion on Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics here – that’s a whole new discussion – I will note that I reject AE on grounds that are similar to the criticisms that Murphy and Callahan had made in their paper on it. I have read critiques of Murpy and Callahan’s paper and find those critiques extremely unconvincing. So if your response is that absolutist libertarian ethics is true because of AE, then, like I said, we won’t make further progress with this discussion.
If you think absolutist libertarian ethics is grounded on something other than AE, please point me to it (I genuinely want to know). And if it is the case that absolutist libertarian ethics is not grounded on anything stronger than the non-aggression principle, and if following the non-aggression principle strictly can sometimes lead to completely impractical implications, then the *combination* of the lack of any convincing grounding of this ethics *and* its impractical implications in some cases is even more reason to believe that absolutist libertarian ethics is wrong.
//In answer to your question of what standard I think is right, I believe you are asking me to give you an exhaustive list of what constitutes a violation and what does not. That is something I cannot give you. I can only give you “meta” arguments of the right way to construct the laundry list, the right way to apply libertarian principles, and the right way to identify rights violations.//
OK – please give me your “meta” argument of the correct way to identify property rights violations.
//I reject it because it can be used to justify the continuation of slavery in a world where slavery has been practised for many years.//
A lot can be said in rebuttal to your slavery argument. However, I am going to hold off on saying anything on this until you help me understand what absolutist libertarian ethics is grounded on, and what your meta argument is regarding the correct way to identify property rights violations.
Sumantra:
“If you are cognizant of the implication to laser beams, then what exactly is your conclusion here? Do you mean that you acknowledge that your universal practice argument fails, i.e. that photons from an artificial light source are in fact an aggression? Or is it something else?”
Again, the topic from which I made the argument that photons are indistinguishable was Wi-Fi. These are photons of a specific frequency. Yet that specific frequency of photons are indistinguishable from all other photons of the same frequency. My argument is not as universal as you made it out to be.
Yes, it is something else. If you can sense photons whose only cause is human action, more than mere human existence, for example seeing a lamp, or laser beam source, these are just instances where your false claim about absolutist libertarian ethics allegedly permitting neighbors from not merely refraining from sending photons into a neighbor’s house, but permitting neighbors to use force to get them to stop emitting them altogether, I.e. even if they can contain them.
My “universal practise” argument was only in response to your universal enforcement argument. That A can stop B from engaging in activity that only affects his own person and property. It was not meant as the end all and be all of how absolutist libertarianism would permit property protection.
“It constitutes a strong case for a refutation because it violates common sense. Saying that everyone in a society needs to accept a massive reduction in their quality of life in order to accommodate one unreasonable individual who is not affected negatively in any way (except in his own mind) by the practices of everyone else violates common sense.”
Lots that is wrong here.
First, the appeal to “common sense” is not good enough as an argument. It only moves the ungrounded statement “strong refutation” backwards a step. For me, it is common sense for individuals to be the absolute decider of what others are allowed to do to their persons and property. That common sense would then dictate photons are not excluded.
Second, again, your argument can be used to justify slavery. Imagine only one slave among 100 million slaves had the intelligence, the courage, and the liberty entrepreneurial foresight to speak out against slavery and to insist that what all other slaves have been brainwashed and threatened into cowardice to believe is justified, is not actually justified. Then, your argument applied would have us say that because the many tens of thousands of masters having to suffer a temporary reduction in their standard of living on account of this one stubborn slave wanting his own freedom, means that the ethic “No slavery” violates common sense.
Third, it is false to claim that everyone in society has to suffer a reduced standard of living on account of this one individual. At most, only those whose actions can be identified as affecting the person or property of the individual in question (again it has to be more than what occurs by merely existing) would have to refrain from reducing the standard of living of the individual in question.
Fourth, and this is more a tangential point, but the way you phrased the scenario, of the one individual being “unreasonable” individual whose claim of a reduction in his standard of living is only “in his head” has all sorts of question begging associated with it.
“What I do claim, however, is that if something violates common sense – especially a sense that is shared by almost everyone living in a society – then there is a strong burden of proof that then falls on the person who thinks that the common sense in that case is wrong, i.e. in this case, the burden of proof will lie on that person to prove that he is right and everyone else is wrong. He may well be proven right, but it’s up to him to prove that he is right.”
Absolutely false. No, the burden of proof cannot be rationally imposed on the minority.
The burden of proof is only rationally imposed on the person making an argument. If you argue that it is ethically justified to alter other people’s property with unwanted photons, then sorry but the burden is on you, not the hapless people whose opinions just happen to be on the minority today.
“My response would be that to make any progress in moral philosophy, you have to start somewhere, and giving the benefit of the doubt to common sense until proven otherwise is a very good place to start, because common sense is usually (though not always) correct. This is the approach that Michael Huemer took in his book The Problem of Political Authority, and it makes for a far more convincing (at least to me) defence of libertarianism than anything else that’s out there.”
OK so common sense is a good starting point, nothing more.
Progress? Are you saying progress occurs not with quality of argument and technology, but merely by the growth in the number of people who accept it for any reason no matter how good or bad the understanding?
“I would ask you in return “Why in fact should we accept absolutist libertarian ethics when it leads to completely impractical implications in some cases?”
You mean it is my job to convinve you to stop aggressing against others, and if I cannot convince you, then that means your ethic is justified?
I could ask you in return: Why should I accept your ethic that does not allow the individual to be ultimate arbiter of what others can and cannot do to their persons and property? Actually, that is a rhetorical question, because I don’t seek your approval or acceptance. If I cannot convince you to stop affecting my property against my will, then I will only say to you that it would be ethically just, according to libertarian ethic, to stop you from doing so.
“On what is absolutist libertarian ethics itself grounded that makes it correct even when following it strictly can sometimes lead to a vast decrease in the quality of life of just about everyone living in a society?”
What do you mean “even when”?
Standards of living of ethical norm aggressors is not a rational standard. The standard has to include everyone.
Libertarianism is not grounded on what makes the standards of living of the most people the most highest. That is utilitarianism, which is not consistent with individual liberty even in the most basic, rudimentary and “non-extremist” definitions.
Libertarianism is also not grounded on pragmatism.
However, it just so happens that libertarianism is both utilitarian and pragmatic.
By your utilitarian logic that the standard should be what makes the most people have the highest standard of living, if the majority of people would for whatever reason derive tremendous joy and euphoria if all redheads were murdered, then the burden of proof would be on the redheads to explain how dare they seek to sacrifice the standards of living of that many people.
Sumantra, you presume a majority wins, minority loses, utilitarianism. All you are doing at root is saying that utilitarianism does not gel with strict libertarianism. That’s it. That the burden is not on you to justify your ethic of utilitarianism, but on libertarians who think the individual should be absolute dictator over their own bodies and property only.
“The only comprehensive attempt at grounding absolutist libertarian ethics that I’ve seen is Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics. While I don’t want to start a long discussion on Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics here – that’s a whole new discussion – I will note that I reject AE on grounds that are similar to the criticisms that Murphy and Callahan had made in their paper on it. I have read critiques of Murpy and Callahan’s paper and find those critiques extremely unconvincing. So if your response is that absolutist libertarian ethics is true because of AE, then, like I said, we won’t make further progress with this discussion.”
I reject your rejection.
“If you think absolutist libertarian ethics is grounded on something other than AE, please point me to it (I genuinely want to know). And if it is the case that absolutist libertarian ethics is not grounded on anything stronger than the non-aggression principle, and if following the non-aggression principle strictly can sometimes lead to completely impractical implications, then the *combination* of the lack of any convincing grounding of this ethics *and* its impractical implications in some cases is even more reason to believe that absolutist libertarian ethics is wrong.”
You have not shown how an ethic being a temporary burden on the aggressors is wrong.
And what is not convincing to you is not a proper standard.
“OK – please give me your “meta” argument of the correct way to identify property rights violations.”
This is not a trite claim or a dodge: Seriously, the meta arguments consist in my responses to you here.
“A lot can be said in rebuttal to your slavery argument.”
That was the one argument I most hoped to read a response.
Ending slavery is a huge burden on those who have become accustomed to it and dependent on it. Thus, in your logic, ending slavery lacks common sense.
“[W]hat absolutist libertarian ethics is grounded on”.
Try process of elimination.
It is not the opinions of the majority.
It is not what works best for the aggressors, i.e. pragmatism.
It is not what we might believe today brings about the highest standards of living for the most people, i.e. utilitarianism.
It is not based on what you find most convincing.
“Third, it is false to claim that everyone in society has to suffer a reduced standard of living on account of this one individual.”
I don’t see how you can say that. You think it would not, but if turned out differently you would have to accept the outcome. There is nothing that dictates what the outcome must be, I think.
You aren’t going to go all Zen on me and say everything every individual does in their actions has a detectable, direct affect on every other individual on a world scale are you Harold?
Sumantra:
Regarding the meta arguments, I should have said it is what WE are doing in the above.
Major.Freedom:
As I had expected, we aren’t going to make any progress with this discussion. So this is going to be my last response to you in this comment thread. If you want to reply to this comment and have the last word, I’ll let you have it.
Since it seems that your absolutist libertarian ethics is grounded in AE, and since I reject AE (and yes, I recognize that you reject my rejection), there isn’t any point in discussing this any further because you and I aren’t going to agree on this – not until I read a paper containing a convincing rebuttal of the numerous, devastating criticisms that have been leveled against AE by Murphy and Callahan, and by others.
Just to be clear, my ethic is NOT utilitarianism (not even in its everyday, non-extreme version). My ethic is similar to the one that Michael Huemer alludes to in his book – that there should be an extremely strong presumption in favour of liberty, but that this presumption is not absolute and can be over-ridden if (and only if) there are sufficiently weighty consequentalist considerations. Yes, this is fuzzy, but unfortunately, the real world is a complex, messy and fuzzy place.
Trying to apply one, single absolutist principle in each and every case (something that I myself tried to do years earlier before I realized that doing so was wrong) may have the benefit of consistency, but doesn’t work well in the real world. And since your response to that is “So what? You still haven’t proven it wrong.” and since my response to that is “And you haven’t proven it right either since your ethics is grounded in AE and AE is flawed”) – like I said, we aren’t going to make much progress here.
//This is not a trite claim or a dodge: Seriously, the meta arguments consist in my responses to you here.//
I wasn’t claiming that you were trying to dodge the issue – I genuinely wanted to know what your meta argument was. Given that we had discussed a number of different topics and you had a number of different responses to me, I don’t know what is and is not part of your meta argument. If you can encapsulate the meta argument that you use to determine what is a property rights violation in a single paragraph and send it to me, I will appreciate it.
Thanks for the exchange of views.
The absolutist libertarian ethic I describe is not grounded on AE. As I said, I consider AE a formal requirement. Both are grounded on something deeper. For me it is pure activity as the datum.
“My ethic is similar to the one that Michael Huemer alludes to in his book – that there should be an extremely strong presumption in favour of liberty, but that this presumption is not absolute and can be over-ridden if (and only if) there are sufficiently weighty consequentalist considerations. Yes, this is fuzzy, but unfortunately, the real world is a complex, messy and fuzzy place.”
Ah yes, the ancient ethic of “Do with your person and property as I dictate, but I will not sully myself with any logical, consistent, sound argument because “complexity”. When you say ” things are fuzzy” you are really only referring to your own principles and beliefs and hedging your bets so that YOU can have final judgment about what others can and cannot do with their own bodies and property. You can convince most people that you are reasonable and considerate, but when push comes to shove, you’ll consider it justified to hurt others when you’re too confused to know the circumstances or your urges in greater detail.
Yes it ethic as you have explained above IS utilitarianism, because you told me that it is morally wrong for one person to experience an increase in utility if it means many others experience a reduction in utility. That of course implies that the moral good is for the many to experience an increase in utility even if it means the minority (of one) experiences a reduction in utility. That is utilitarianism!
“Trying to apply one, single absolutist principle in each and every case (something that I myself tried to do years earlier before I realized that doing so was wrong) may have the benefit of consistency, but doesn’t work well in the real world.”
But you always were applying one absolutist principle, namely, “What I, Sumantra, choose is the best approach, direct or meta, is the best approach.”
Your approach that you have fuzzily explained above, which you say is “similar to Michael Huemer”, is meta-absolutist. It is this:
“Ultimately, if I do not bother to explain the complex reasonings of my ethics in such and such examples, because they are ” real world fuzzy”, then I reserve the right to decide the best approach on how everyone ought to arrive at the best ethical norm to practise. In addition, should anyone question my absolutist me as ultimate arbiter principle regardless of property rights, then I will call you a mislead absolutist because you are not making yourself absolutist over property rights.”
You have, I think, missed the whole point.
You say that these boundary crossings do no harm. This presupposes that my distress (if any) from knowing that your radio waves have crossed my property does not count as harm. In other words, your theory seems to be that purely psychic damage doesn’t count.
Well, that makes a lot of sense. But it also seems to imply that if I install a hidden camera in your bedroom and post the footage to the Internet, I’ve done you no harm that counts. Just like the radio waves, my intrusion does you no direct harm. All it does is cause you distress which I might choose to dismiss as irrelevant because you can’t point to a way in which it has deprived you of the use of your property.
The problem here is not “Are radio waves a violation of property rights?”. The problem instead is: “What is the key property of radio waves that differentiates them from hidden cameras?”. I do not think that any of the obvious easy answers will work here. In each case, all of the harm comes from distress on your part that I can easily dismiss as purely psychological. Why does some purely psychologicl distress count and other purely psychological distresss not count? Telling me that radio waves don’t count fails to address this question.
Steve, there is a whole tradition in legal theory (apparently) distinguishing between trespass and nuisance. Did you see my follow-up post quoting more from Rothbard on this? It gives an answer to your question. You might not like the answer, but it’s there.
Landsberg,
Installing a hidden camera in someone’s house without their consent is depriving them of their own unique use of their property. If they wanted to enjoy their property with a camera, they would have installed it themselves. Given that they have not, it means that they enjoy their property without a camera, and thus someone installing a hidden camera in their house would prevent them from enjoying their house as they see fit.
The fact that they don’t know about the property violation is irrelevant.
Rothbard argued that no property violation takes place if the owner is not prevented from enjoying their property as they see fit. In the case of radio waves, only if it can be explained how the owner is not able to enjoy his house, or in the “psychic utility” scenario you describe: his body, as he sees fit due to the radio waves, would the radio waves be considered a property violation.
Installing a hidden camera affects the material property.
Radio waves may or may not affect one’s person.
Pure subjective “psychic thoughts” on the matter were never meant by Rothbard to be totally detached from objective reality. He did not man that A can file a complaint against B because he believes B is giving the “evil eye” or evil demons to A’s property.