In my latest IER column, I quote from a very revealing Vox article. It is crystal clear that progressive Leftists–whether we’re talking the nerdy wonks or the activist boots on the ground–want nothing to do with a revenue-neutral carbon tax.
I also try a different analogy to get people to see why these state-level carbon taxes are window dressing, and that it’s misleading to calibrate their tax rates to the “social cost of carbon”:
The analysis underlying the “social cost of carbon” implicitly assumes that the associated tax is levied globally. If instead only some jurisdictions levy the carbon tax, then we have to worry about “leakage”—when businesses and individuals transfer their emissions to outside, untaxed jurisdictions.
It should be clear that Washington State itself levying a carbon tax, even a draconian one, will not significantly affect global greenhouse gas emissions, particularly over the course of decades. As such, the “optimal” carbon tax when a state like Washington acts unilaterally is much lower than what the concept of the “social cost of carbon” implies….(The Vox article itself shows a chart indicating that the state of Texas alone has about nine times the carbon dioxide emissions as Washington State.)
For an analogy, suppose someone saw people dropping litter on a beach, and wanted to levy a fine to discourage this behavior. Now people could argue about the appropriate size of the fine; make it too little, like 10 cents per infraction, and it wouldn’t solve the litter problem. But make it too big, like $10,000 per infraction, and tourists might stop going to the beach altogether for fear of accidentally losing a napkin in the wind and having to pay a huge penalty.
Yet we can all agree that whatever the “right” level of the fine would be, it would be nonsense to apply that same dollar fee to only a small section of the beach that covered, say, one-one thousandth of the total surface area of the sand. It is clear that such a policy would be idiotic, because people would simply make sure not to set up their blankets on that tiny fraction of the beach, and would otherwise continue with their normal behavior.
This is analogous to Yoram Bauman’s proposal. His carbon tax would apply to Washington State, which has about 0.3 percent of the total habitable land surface area of planet Earth….Advocates are mixing in hopes that they will achieve copy-cat policies all over the globe in order for their suggestion to make any sense, even taking their own climate models as given.
In response to a listener request, Carlos and I define/discuss basic terms like “Treasuries” and “yield curve.”
Also, if you want comp’d tickets to the Nov. 5 Mises Circle event in Fort Worth, contact me (soon).
I know it sounds like I’m being sarcastic or trollish, but I mean this sincerely. Over the years I have seen other economists use national income accounting identities to make points about saving and investment, and I am not deft in such things. I think it’s because in my undergrad days I was at an anti-Keynesian / anti-macro school, and then by the time I went to NYU they were teaching formal New Keynesian models with microfoundations and rational expectations, so we didn’t do I+G = S+T kind of stuff.
In that light, then, please read Scott’s recent response to a commenter at EconLog who thought the Fed was distorting the capital markets and causing saving to go into existing assets, rather than new ones. Because the wording might be important, here’s exactly what the guy said: “In a less risk-averse and more economically free environment, savings would be flowing into new investments. But right now all that’s happening is that this savings is being used to bid up prices on existing assets, mainly housing. So this asset bubble is reducing investment in other areas of the economy.”
Now, here’s how Scott apparently blew the guy up:
Saving does not and indeed cannot flow into existing assets, at least in net terms. You might use $X of your income to buy a certain asset, like an existing house. But that’s offset by the fact that the person you buy the house from receives $X for selling the asset. In net terms, no saving has been absorbed in this transaction. In contrast, savings get absorbed when new capital goods are constructed, as when a new home is built. Because saving equals investment, we need never worry about saving being directed into non-investment uses, at least in aggregate terms.
I think I understand (partially) the kind of argument Scott is making, but I don’t think his conclusion follows. Specifically, I think Scott interpreted the commenter to be saying, “Because of the Fed, S > I.” Then Scott was showing that no, that’s impossible, S necessarily equals I.
However, that wasn’t what the guy was actually claiming (go re-read if you need to). In the comments, the guy backed down, no doubt intimidated by Scott’s superior command of economics and his (Scott’s) confidence. But I think the guy should’ve stuck to his guns. Here’s what I would have said:
1) “Scott, you think you’ve proven that savings can flow into a new capital good, but you left out one important thing: When I spend $100,000 on a newly constructed house, that money goes to the seller of the house. So no net saving could’ve been absorbed by this transaction after all–right? I mean, that’s the same argument you used against me.”
2) “Scott, I’m having a hard time reconciling your position with the subjective theory of value. Suppose Smith starts with a $100,000 house. Then he builds another, small house right next to it, and sells that second (new) house for $25,000. We all agree this represents net $25,000 of investment in the economy, right? OK, now suppose instead Smith builds a deck on his original house, and sells the whole thing for $125,000. We all agree that this represents a net $25,000 of new saving and investment in the economy, right? Finally, because all of a sudden Smith is famous, people want to live in his house more than before. His house appreciates in value to $125,000, and Smith sells it to a fanboy. Are you saying this does *not* represent $25,000 in net investment in the economy? Why not? Is it because physical nails and hammers weren’t involved?”
So I am being dead serious, I would appreciate it if someone (preferably a trained economist) could explain to me what Scott meant, and how he would answer the above, hypothetical pushback. (If Scott himself chimes in, even better.)
==> The latest Contra Krugman details just how awesome the Contra Cruise was. And we talk about Krugman for a bit, too.
==> I have not explored this, but the SAFE network’s proponents claim it is better than blockchain technology.
==> Mario Rizzo (my dissertation chair) tells the FT that the Austrians don’t fit into their box of “heterodox.”
==> This election is so bad that Christian anarchy is now respectable.
My talk to the Libertarian Christian Institute.
I had never heard Johnson talk about Mt. Everest like this before, and I didn’t know Jill Stein had dropped a dope album back in the day.
This video made me like Johnson slightly less, like Stein a lot more, and like John Oliver slightly less. Oh and the tiger guy is a riot.
P.S. If you’re short on time, just watch it from 5:00 for a minute, you’ll see why.
(Thanks to Bob Roddis for the video.)
This EconLog post from Scott Sumner, and the accompanying post from Don Boudreaux, provide much useful pushback against typical worries about trade deficits. However, Sumner in particular makes some strong claims that are misleading, and the two posts together could understandably make critics think that free traders are naive and distracting people from a genuine danger.
To be sure, I am not doubting the case for free trade. Rather, I’m saying that when Scott and Don write posts with such confidence (bordering on smugness), if they actually overstep, then it really makes it hard to convince critics who start out suspicious.
The easiest way for me to illustrate is through a simplistic fable. Because I’m still sick of apples from the Great Debt Debate, I’ll use bananas.
Originally all of the real estate in the USA is owned by Americans. The only output good is bananas. There are 100 units of land, and each produces one banana per period. Real GDP is 100 bananas. In the beginning, Americans consume all the bananas. GDP = C + I + G + Nx = 100 + 0 + 0 + 0. There is no trade deficit (or surplus). Let’s denote this original situation as Period 0.
Then at some point a US firm wants to fertilize some of the land to make it more productive, but it can’t raise any domestic capital because American savings is zero. So Chinese savers lend the US firm the money. Specifically they lend the market equivalent of 20 bananas worth of fertilizer.
So we now have the following:
Period 1: GDP=100; C=100, I=20, G=0, Nx=-20.
Specifically, the Americans still eat all 100 bananas that are grown domestically, and the Chinese send over 20 units of fertilizer (measured in bananas’ of market value). GDP is still 100 bananas, while domestic investment is now 20 bananas and we have a trade deficit of 20 bananas. Because there were no earnings on foreign investments either way, the current account deficit is also 20 bananas, while the capital account surplus is 20 bananas. Americans imported more goods (fertilizer) than they exported, while foreigners invested more in American assets than vice versa.
Now the interest rate on this debt is 5 percent. Further assume that the increase in physical yield is 5 percent. (I’m assuming the relative prices of bananas, land, and fertilizer all stay the same, just to keep it simple.) Just to isolate the effect of the original bout of Chinese saving/investment, suppose there is no new investment. Then we have:
Period 2: GDP=101; C=100, I=0, G=0, Nx=1.
Specifically, the application of 20 units’ worth of fertilizer in Period 1 has caused a permanent increase in real output from the land, to the tune of 1 extra banana per period. Americans still consume the 100 bananas they always had, while 1 banana is exported to the Chinese who consume it as interest on their debt. The US has a trade surplus of 1 banana, but a current account deficit/surplus of 0 (and of course a capital account surplus/deficit of 0).
Now, however, suppose that the Chinese keep rolling over their interest earnings on the US debt. That is, instead of consuming their interest income, instead they acquire more US assets. Yet for whatever reason, the Americans do not match this influx of additional Chinese savings with increased domestic investment, but rather with increased domestic consumption.
The simplest way to think of it is to start by studying the numbers in Period 2. When that 1 banana in interest income flows to China, they redirect it to lend to an American who eats it today. Now how does that American convince the Chinese owner to do that? He can either issue debt (i.e. a promise to pay bananas over the course of the future), or he can sell some of his land.
Let’s assume he sells the land, which is capitalized at 5 percent. That is, to receive 1 banana today, an American sells the Chinese person 1/20th of a unit of land.
At some point the Chinese own half of the real estate in the US. They again reinvest all of their earnings rather than consume any bananas. Let’s look at the numbers for that period:
Period n: GDP=101; C=101, I=0, G=0, Nx=0.
All 101 bananas physically produced on US soil are eaten by Americans. But what the GDP figures don’t show is that only 50 of the bananas were produced on land owned by Americans. The other 51 were grown on land owned by the Chinese. Yet rather than eat them, the Chinese sold these bananas to Americans, in exchange for about 2.5 units of US soil. Thus, an the end of period n, the Chinese now own about 52.5 units of US soil, while Americans only own about 47.5 units.
[UPDATE: In this period, the current account deficit is 51 bananas and the capital account surplus is 51 bananas. The Chinese earn 51 bananas’ worth more of real income from US assets than Americans earn from their Chinese assets–which are $0 in this exercise–and this is matched by the Chinese acquiring on net 51 bananas’ worth of additional US assets this period. But note that there is no trade deficit in this period. The fact that Americans are “living beyond their means” is reflected in the net sale of assets [financial claims on future US banana output] to the Chinese, not in the physical importation of goods made in China.)
In the long run, the Chinese eventually acquire ownership of just about the entire real estate in the US. Because the Americans now have no assets to sell, the Chinese revert to consuming the annual yield of their assets. The long run numbers look like this:
Period LR: GDP=101; C=0, I=0, G=0, Nx=101.
The US trade surplus is 101 bananas, while the current account deficit/surplus is 0, and the capital account surplus/deficit is 0. No American eats anything. All US output is shipped to Chinese for their consumption.
Now here’s what’s really interesting. At every single point along the way, free market economists were blogging that there was nothing to worry about, and that the critics were simply racists who hated the Chinese. For example, one economist pointed out that the Americans couldn’t possibly be living beyond their means, because in no period did C ever exceed GDP.
Another economist pointed to the example of Period 1, when the trade deficit fueled an increase in domestic investment, paving the way for permanently higher GDP. This was obviously benign, and a reflection of the superior investment opportunities in the US vis-a-vis China.
These free market economists were particularly amused when the critics engaged in silly rhetoric by claiming that “Americans were selling their birthright for a mess of pottage,” etc. The free market economists argued that selling US real estate was the same thing as shipping a banana plant overseas, and yet the former was counted as an import while the latter was counted as an export. For some arbitrary reason, the people at the BEA thought selling real estate was somehow different from exporting bananas. What mercantilist idiots!
P.S. It should go without saying that I am not saying a tariff or other government restriction on trade would help things. I’m just trying to get you guys to see why people like Vox Day think libertarian economists are fools.
P.P.S. Don Boudreaux was being much more careful than Scott Sumner was. Don was arguing that trade deficits might not be a problem, etc. But after you’ve digested my fable above, go re-read Scott’s post. He is way too sweeping in some of his statements. And look at how he dismisses the quite serious objection by Phil in the comments, like it’s a real chore to have to answer somebody who gives a counterexample to his sweeping (and unqualified) statements in the original post.
P.P.P.S. I am particularly sensitive to this because I did a very similar thing with Peter Schiff back before the financial crisis. (In this piece I was pretty careful, but not so much in this piece, forcing me to write a mea culpa.) I’m not saying I’m better than Scott or Don, I’m saying I’m wiser since I got burned before. In particular, neither Scott nor Don even mentions the fact that the Chinese hold $1.2 trillion worth of Treasuries. What reason do we have to think that this has gone hand in hand with wise domestic investments that boost US output?
I have some comp’d tickets to the Mises Circle event in Fort Worth on Nov. 5. Shoot me an email if you want to go and bring a guest or two.